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Abstract. Autonomous agents (AA) will increasingly be interacting
with us in our daily lives. While we want the benefits attached to AAs,
it is essential that their behavior is aligned with our values and norms.
Hence, an AA will need to estimate the values and norms of the humans
it interacts with, which is not a straightforward task when solely observ-
ing an agent’s behavior. This paper analyses to what extent an AA is
able to estimate the values and norms of a simulated human agent (SHA)
based on its actions in the ultimatum game. We present two methods to
reduce ambiguity in profiling the SHAs: one based on search space ex-
ploration and another based on counterfactual analysis. We found that
both methods are able to increase the confidence in estimating human
values and norms, but differ in their applicability, the latter being more
efficient when the number of interactions with the agent is to be mini-
mized. These insights are useful to improve the alignment of AAs with
human values and norms.
Keywords: Autonomous agents; Values; Norms; Ultimatum game.
1 Introduction
As autonomous agents (AAs) become more pervasive in our daily lives, there
is a growing need to reduce the risk of undesired impacts on our society [2, 12].
Hence, we need design and engineering approaches that consider the implications
of ethically relevant decision-making by machines, understanding the AA as part
of a socio-technical system [8, p.48]. For this, we need to ensure that the decisions
and actions made by the AA are aligned with the stakeholders’ values (“what
one finds important in life” [23]) and norms (what is standard, acceptable or
permissible behavior in a group or society [10]).
Values and norms can be seen as criteria for decision-making: values relating
to more abstract and context-independent ideals, and norms as more concrete
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context-dependent rules. Furthermore, since humans use values and norms in
their explanations, the use of these concepts allows for a better explanation
of the AA [15–17]. People have a common base system of values and they are
relatively stable over the life span of a person [4], however, values and norms vary
significantly for each person and socio-cultural environment, making it difficult
or even impossible to write down precise rules describing them. One approach
to deal with this variance is to treat aligning the actions of the AA with human
values as a learning problem [13,27]. However, estimating values and norms solely
based on observed behavior may lead to ambiguous results. Different relative
preferences towards values and norms can bring about the same behavior, i.e.
there are many “reasons why” that might motivate a given observed behavior
(ambiguity problem). In case that an agent’s actions are driven by a “wrong”
set of values and norms, strong ethical consequences may befall.
This paper studies the conditions under which AAs are able to make confident
estimates of one’s preference on values and norms from observed behavior. We
studied the behavior of simulated agents driven by both values and social norms
in the Ultimatum Game (UG), specifically in the proposer role. [20] has used the
UG to study the relative importance of values across cultures. We focus on the
relative importance of values and norms that guide individual decision making,
aiming to provide useful insights to improve the alignment of AAs with human
values and norms.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we propose an agent-
based model to play the UG, expanded from [16], which uses both values and
norms for determining the actions of the agents. Second, we present a method
for estimating an agent’s relative preferences to a given set of values and, if
necessary, to improve the confidence in these estimations. This improvement
is realized by interacting with the proposer agent in the UG, either by a free
exploration of the search space or by the use of counterfactuals.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following section
presents a brief context about the UG and how we model values and norms
in this context. Section 3 presents both the method to estimate the relative
preference attributed to an agent’s values and norm, and the methods to reduce
ambiguity on the estimation. Section 4 presents the main results of this research
and section 5 discusses these results. Finally, section 6 presents the conclusions.
2 Values and norms in the ultimatum game
2.1 Scenario: The Ultimatum Game
We simulate the behavior of the agents in the UG, first introduced by [11]. In the
UG, two players negotiate over a fixed amount of money (the ‘pie’). The proposer
demands a portion of the pie, while the remainder is offered to the responder.
The responder chooses to accept or reject this proposed split. If the responder
chooses to ‘accept’, the proposed split is implemented. If the responder chooses
to ‘reject’, both players get no money. The UG thus provides an environment
where players have to make decisions about money based on their own judgment.
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The remainder of the paper uses a version of the UG with the following
specifics:
– An experiment has 32 players: 16 proposers and 16 responders.
– One experiment has 20 rounds. One round in the UG comprises one demand
for each proposer and one reply for each matched responder.
– The players are paired to a different player each round but do not change
roles.
– Players are anonymous to each other.
– The pie size P is 10005.
These specifics are chosen for pragmatic reasons: the paper uses an empirical
dataset based on these specifics [3] and builds upon a model based on these
specifics [16].
This paper models the decision-making of humans in the UG by using values
and norms, but there have been many different approaches to it since its first
appearance in [11]. One reason for its popularity is that the UG is a classical
example of where the canonical game-theoretical agent (i.e., the homo economics
that only cares about maximizing its direct own welfare) falls short. The homo
economicus only cares about its direct welfare and thus will accept any posi-
tive offer in the UG. Humans, in contrast, reject offers as high as 40% of the
pie [21]. Behavioral economics has aimed to explain humans by incorporating
learning [25], reputation [9] or other-regarding preferences. Recently, [16] used
values and norms to explain UG behavior. Using a series of agent-based sim-
ulation experiments, [16] showed that the model produces aggregate behavior
that falls within the 95% confidence interval wherein human behavior lies more
often than the other tested agent models (e.g., a learning homo economicus
model). Moreover, the model uses concepts that humans use in their explana-
tions. Thus because the model has been shown to reproduce human behavior
and uses explainable concepts, the model of [16] provides a starting point to
estimate preference towards human values and norms for value alignment.
2.2 Simulated Human agent (SHA)
The simulated human agent (SHA) represents the human in the UG whose values
and norms we aim to estimate. The model for the SHA is based on the value-
based model and norm-based model presented in [16]. These models focus on the
aggregate properties that emerge from pairing these agents in the UG. However,
this paper focuses on estimating relative preference towards values and norms
of individual agents. Therefore, we are interested in an agent model where one
agent uses both values and norms. The remainder of this section presents the
SHA model in three parts: the value-based agent (from [16]), the norm-based
agent (extension of [16]) and an agent that uses both values and norms (new).
5 For ease of presentation, we chose to present P with no monetary unit. Empirical
work [21] shows that the effect of the pie size is relatively small.
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Value-Based Agent The value-based agent uses the importance an agent at-
tributes to its values to determine what an agent (based on its values) should
demand. [16] focuses on two values that are relevant in the UG: wealth and
fairness and define dia as the difference in importance an agent attributes to
wealth versus fairness. Based on research by [26] and data on the UG [3], they
then state a number of requirements for a function (see [16] for more details).
First, they assume a (perfect) negative correlation between wealth and fairness.
Second, valuing wealth is defined as wanting more money. Third, valuing fairness
is defined as wanting an equal split of the pie. Fourth, agents should differ in
how much money they demand, but not demand below 0.5P. The functions that
map dia to the demand d ∈ {0...P} ⊂ Z are given by
valueDemand(dia) = argmax
d∈{0...P}⊂Z
u(d, dia, P ) (1)
and
u(d, dia, P ) = −1.0 + 0.5diad
P + 0.5
− 1.0− 0.5dia|0.5P−d|
0.5P + 0.5
(2)
The agent thus calculates the utility for each demand d and returns the demand
with the maximum utility. [16] shows these functions fulfill the stated require-
ments. By using (1) and (2), we enable our agent to choose a demand following
theories on values [26] and [3] empirical results on the UG.
Norm-Based Agent The norm-based agent uses the replies it observes from
the other agent to determine what an agent (based on its norms) should demand.
In [16], following theories by [5] and [10], it is stated that a norm exists for
a particular person when that person perceives what most other people do or
expect it. [16] provides a translation from this definition to a model for the UG. In
the UG, the proposer cannot see what other proposers do, because the proposer
is only paired with responders. Therefore, the proposer uses the responses of the
responder to form an idea of what is expected (i.e., the norm). [16] provides the
following function to map the observed responses (ORak) seen by agent a up to
the current round k to a demand d ∈ {0...P} ⊂ Z,
normDemand(ORak) =
min
d∈RDak
d+ max
d∈ADak
d
2
(3)
where RDak ⊂ ORak is the set of demands that the proposer a has seen rejected
and ADak ⊂ ORak is the set of demands that the proposer a has seen accepted.
The function thus uses two indicators to estimate the norm: the minimum of the
rejected demands (RDak) and the maximum of the accepted demands (ADak).
The rejection of a given demand indicates that the demand is higher than ex-
pected, thus the norm is lower than the minimum rejected demand. The accep-
tance of a given demand indicates that the demand is lower than expected (or
perfect), thus the norm is higher (or equal) to the accepted demand. Equation
(3) determines the norm as the average of these two indicators. By using (3), we
enable our agent to choose a demand following [5] and [10] theories on norms.
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We extend the model provided by [16] to specify normDemand(ORak) for
three edge cases: a case where there are no observed responses (ORak = ∅),
a case with only observed rejections (RDak = ORak), and a case with only
observed accepts (ADak = ORak):
– ORak = ∅ → normDemand(ORak) is drawn from the normal distribution
N(561.8, 128.9), which is the normal distribution human demands follow in
the empirical dataset we use of [3].6
– RDak = ORak → the agent averages between the minimum reject and halve
the pie (( min
d∈RDak
d+ 0.5P )/2).
– ADak = ORak → the agent averages between the maximum accept and the
full pie (( max
d∈ADak
d+ P )/2)).
In [16], the agent determines a randomized demand as the norm in all these
cases. By specifying these edge cases, we improve the SHA model aiming to
better represent human behavior.
Agent with Values and Norms This paper combines the value-based agent
and the norm-based agent to model an agent that uses both values and norms.
Values and norms are decision-making concepts the agent uses to decide what
action is good and what action is bad [17]. [6] used values as more abstract
ideals and norms as the more concrete context-dependent rules that follow from
these ideals. Norms follow from values, but when agents copy the norms (but not
values) from other agents the two can conflict. For example, one copies working
over-hours although this is in conflict with its own values. This paper presents a
model where an agent uses a weight (vwa) to combine the best action based on
values and the best action based on norms into the best action based on both
values and norms.
For a proposer an action is defined as a demand d ∈ {0...P} ⊂ Z. The demand
d for an agent a in round k is determined by
dak(dia, vwa, ORak) = vwa × valueDemand(dia)
+ (1− vwa)× normDemand(ORak), (4)
where dia stands for the difference in importance an agent attributes to wealth
versus the importance it attributes to fairness, vwa ∈ [0, 1] stands for the weight
an agent attributes to its own values (versus the weight it attributes to norms)
and ORak stands for the set of observed replies the agent has seen. Thus what
an agent demands is the result of weighting the result of two functions described
in [16]: the valueDemand(dia) (1) and the normDemand(ORak) (3).
The above focuses on the demands of the SHA-proposer (SHA-P), but to
simulate the UG we also need SHA-responders (SHA-R). The SHA-R is defined
the same way as to the proposer model except that it determines a threshold
6 The norm that is drawn from the normal distribution is not used as input for the
norm in subsequent rounds (i.e., the agent does not memorize it).
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t ∈ [0, P ] (instead of a demand d) and has to base its norms on a set of observed
demands (instead of observed responses). The SHA-R uses the same function
as the SHA-P (4) to determine the threshold. If the demand is higher than the
threshold the responder rejects it, if the demand is lower than or equal to the
threshold accepts it. The responder determines a threshold appropriate for its
values analogue to the proposer, that is, by using (1) and (2). The responder
determines the norm for the threshold by averaging over the observed demands
(instead of the observed responses). The proposed demand is thus seen as a
signal from the proposer that this is what the proposer considers ‘normal’.7 By
using a threshold t based on its values and the norm (from observed demands),
the responder uses values and norms to reject or accept the proposed demand.
Above we presented a model that uses both values and norms using two
agent-specific variables: the difference in importance (di) and the value-norm
weight (vw). The difference in importance specifies how much an agent values
wealth over fairness and is normally distributed over agents N(µdi, σdi), being
µdi the average value and σdi the standard distribution of a normal distribution
for di. The value-norm weight specifies how much an agent weighs values over
norms and is normally distributed over agents N(µvw, σvw). Both variables are
constant over the different rounds. However, the normDemand(ORak) differs
per round as the observed replies vary. To reproduce the demands and responses
humans give, the parameters µdi, σdi, µvw and σvw need to be calibrated to the
right settings.
2.3 Calibrating the SHA to humans
We found that µdi = 0.5, σdi = 0.25, µvw = −0.6 and σvw = 1.14 produced
simulated demands and responses that are closest to the empirical data on hu-
man demands and responses extracted from the dataset provided by [3]. This
meta-study combines the data of 6 empirical studies to create a dataset of 5950
demands and replies made by humans in the same scenario as we describe in
Section 2.1. We used five performance measures for which we compared the syn-
thetic data on the SHA to the empirical data on real humans: average demand
µd, standard deviation in demand σd, average acceptance rate µa, standard de-
viation in acceptance rate σa and the standard deviation in the demand solely
based on values σvd.
8 The SHA is compared to humans on both round 1 and
round 10. We used the following procedure to find the optimal parameter set-
tings:
1. Run simulations of the UG in Repast Simphony with different parameter
settings (µdi ∈ [−1, 1] and µvw ∈ [0, 1]) and different random seeds (r ∈
7 To be exact, the proposed demand should be considered as what the proposer con-
siders a ‘normal’ threshold. If it considered a higher threshold to be normal it would
have demanded less, if it considered a lower threshold normal it would have de-
manded more.
8 The standard deviation in the demand solely based on values σvd was added to
ensure agents vary in what values they find important (dia). The σvd for humans is
postulated instead of extracted from empirical data.
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[1, 30]) and obtain the resulting demands and acceptance rate (µd, σd, µa,
σa);
2. For each run: average the performance measures with the same parameter
settings, but different random seeds;
3. For each parameter setting: calculate the normalized root mean square error
(NRMSE) between the simulated results and the human results;
4. Pick the parameter setting with a minimal NRMSE.
Table 1 compares the resulting demands and responses for the SHA (when
NRMSE is minimized) and the empirical data on human results. We interpret
these results as that our SHA can produce a distribution of demands and accepts
that it is fairly close to that of humans (NRMSE = 11.0). The remainder of the
paper uses these parameter settings to simulate human behavior based on values
and norms.
Table 1. A comparison of the distribution of demands and responses between empirical
data on humans and synthetic data on simulated human agents (SHAs) given the
parameter settings with the best fit (µdi = 0.5, σdi = 0.25, µvw = −0.6 and σvw =
1.14).
Performance Measures
Round Source µd σd µa σa σvd
1 empirical (human) 561.8 128.9 0.806 0.40 128.9
synthetic (SHA) 557.9 91.1 0.876 0.29 109.2
10 empirical (human) 584.2 98.66 0.868 0.34 122.5
synthetic (SHA) 646.8 90.89 0.923 0.23 109.2
3 Estimating relative preferences on values and norms
The conceptual model of the estimation process is presented in Fig. 1. The
Profiling Agent (PA) is responsible to estimate the relative preference of a given
SHA-P towards values and norms ([dˆia, vˆwa]), and whenever necessary, interact
with the SHA-P to reduce ambiguity in the estimation.
The problem of estimating values and norms in the context of this work
is translated to the estimation of dia and vwa, represented as [dˆia,vˆwa]. The
estimation of relative preferences from behavior was assessed in different ways,
such as via Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) algorithms [1, 12, 14, 18] and
learning a utility function with influence diagrams [19]. In this work, we use
the UG as a simple context (two values and one norm), aiming for clarity on
understanding the conditions necessary to properly estimate the relative value
and norm preference from behavior and, whenever necessary, how to reduce
ambiguity.
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SHA-P
(Proposer)
SHA-R
(Responder)
PA
Data
Accept or reject proposal
Proposes demandAmbiguity reduction
(AR-SS or AR-C)
Estimation ;
Fig. 1. Conceptual model.
In the context of the UG we can perform the estimation of the relative
preferences by a exhaustive search process on the estimators, according to:
[dˆia, vˆwa] = argmin
dia∈[−0.15;1.79];vwa∈[0;1]
∑m
k=1
∣∣∣dˆak(dia, vwa, ORak)− dak∣∣∣
k
(5)
where ˆdak is calculated by (4), and m represents the number of rounds from
the UG analyzed in the estimation. In short, the estimators dˆia and ˆvwa are
defined as the preference set that minimizes the deviation between the observed
demand (dak) and the demand that was calculated by an exhaustive search
process ( ˆdak). The range for dia which has an effect on the demand by the
SHA-P is [−0.15; 1.79]. With vwa ∈ [0; 1], and using a step of 0.01 to explore
both variables, 19,392 evaluations of the fitness function are necessary for each
estimation process.
3.1 Reducing ambiguity
Ambiguity arises whenever the number of elements of dˆia and ˆvwa is greater than
1. The PA will try to reduce this ambiguity by taking the role of the responder
on the UG. This interaction might be interpreted as an elicitation process or, in
simple, the PA will ask the SHA-P “questions”. Different ways of “asking these
questions” may produce higher or lower quality answers, and consequently a
higher or lower change in the confidence on the estimation. We will explore two
different approaches to how the PA interacts with the SHA-P. These interactions
are a “side-game”, i.e. changes in ORa will not, by definition, influence future
actions of the SHA-P.
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Ambiguity Reduction by exploring the Search Space (AR-SS) The
approach to ambiguity reduction via exploring the search space (AR−SS) poses
the following “question” to the SHA: What would your next demand be?. Based
on the demand (“answer”) provided by the SHA-P, the PA will reject or accept
it to explore the search space (Algorithm 1). This approach increases the search
space, i.e. the distribution of ORa in the dataset, by rejecting demands lower
than rejected before and accepting demands higher than accepted before.
Algorithm 1: Ambiguity Reduction by exploring the Search Space (AR−
SS)
input : dˆia, vˆwa, maxint,RDa,ADa,ORa, da, k
output: dˆia, vˆwa,RDa,ADa,ORa, count
nsolutions ←number of solutions ([dˆia, vˆwa])
k ← k + 1
Calculate ORak
count← 0
while nsolutions > 1 AND count < maxint do
Calculate dˆak(dˆia, vˆwa, ORak) (4)
Include ORak and dˆak to the data set
Estimate [dˆia,vˆwa] (5)
nsolutions ← number of solutions ([dˆia, vˆwa])
if dak < min(RDa) OR @ RDa then
RDak ← dak
else if dak > max(ADa) OR @ ADa then
ADak ← dak
k ← k + 1
Calculate ORa,k
count← count+ 1
Ambiguity Reduction via Counterfactuals (AR-C) Counterfactuals are
mental representations of alternatives to events that have already occurred [24],
frequently represented by conditional propositions related to questions in the
“what if” form. Philosophical discussion on counterfactuals has been present for
ages, including works from David Hume and John Stuart Mill [22], and it is
considered an intrinsic element of causality. People use counterfactuals often in
daily life to create alternatives to reality guided by rational principles.
Our approach to reduce ambiguity on the estimation of values and norms
via counterfactual (AR−C) poses the following “question” to the SHA-P: What
would your next demand be if your opponent had accepted instead of rejected your
proposal on round “x”? or What would your next demand be if your opponent
had rejected instead of accepting your proposal on round “x”?. As presented in
10 L. C. Siebert et al.
Algorithm 2, the PA will ‘ask’ the ‘question’ related to the round that will lead
to a broader search space in terms of the observed social norm (ORa).
Algorithm 2: Ambiguity Reduction via Counterfactuals (AR-C)
input : dˆia, vˆwa, RDa,ADa,ORa, da,k
output: dˆia, vˆwa,RDa,ADa,ORa, count
maxint ← k
count← 0
nsolutions ←number of solutions ([dˆia, vˆwa])
while nsolutions > 1 AND count < maxint do
for i = 1 : k do
if ∃ ADai (Proposal was accepted in round i) then
if dai < min(RDa) OR @ RDa then
RDai ← dai
else if ∃ RDai (Proposal was rejected in round i) then
if dai > max(ADa) OR @ ADa then
ADai ← dai
Calculate ORai
scorei ← min(|ORai −ORa|)
k ← k + 1
ORak ← ORaz, where z is the iteration where score is maximum
Calculate dˆak(dˆia, vˆwa, ORak) (4)
Include ORak and dnew to the data set
Estimate [dˆia,vˆwa] (5)
nsolutions ←number of solutions ([dˆia, vˆwa])
count← count+ 1
4 Results
To test the methods presented in this paper we analyzed the behavior of agents
acting as proponents (SHA-P) in 100 runs of the UG (each with 20 rounds), in
terms of precision and confidence. The first will be evaluated by the root mean
squared error (RMSE) between the observed demand (d) and the estimated
demand (dˆ), while the latter by the number of elements in [dˆia, vˆwa]. A small
number of elements represent high confidence (low ambiguity), while a large
number of solutions represent low confidence (high ambiguity). It is guaranteed
the number of elements of [dˆia, vˆwa] is greater than zero, since we perform an
exhaustive search in the complete range of dia and vwa. With these results, we
aim to analyze the conditions under which the proposed methods can estimate
preferences on values and norms in a precise and confident manner.
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4.1 Estimation of values and norms
The precision in the estimation increased with the number of rounds used, given
that an estimation is made by observing at least four rounds (Fig. 2. (a)). Using
less than four rounds the estimated values and norms ([dˆia, vˆwa]) predicted a
demand (dˆ) that is very close to the real demand9, but most of these estimations
will not be able to generalize among other contexts (i.e. other observed response
- ORa).
Fig. 2. (a) Precision of the estimation process. (b) Percentage of unique solutions for
the estimation process.
When considering between one and four rounds the estimations were am-
biguous: on average 69.2 different sets of estimations led to the same demand
(Fig. 2. (b)). Nevertheless, the confidence in the estimation increased with the
number of rounds used. The steep curve reaching round four appears in both
figures, showing a correlation between this initial precision in the estimation of
the demand with the ambiguity on estimating preferences toward values and
norms. Even with an increasing number of rounds observed, the percentual of
unique solutions reached an average of only ca. 60%. These different estimations
may lead to undesired properties of an agent that wants to act on behalf of the
true values and norms of a given person.
4.2 Reducing ambiguity
Both proposed methods were able to increase confidence in the estimation of
preferences on values and norms ([dˆia, vˆwa]). Comparing Fig. 3. (a) with Fig.
2. (a), the RMSE between the calculated and observed demand are slightly
higher, but still may be considered adequate in absolute values, given that d ∈
{0...1000} ⊂ Z.
9 Given the deterministic model of the SHA, it might be expected that the RMSE
should tend to zero. This is not the case because [d, valueDemand, normDemand] ∈
Z, and therefore a rounding operator is used.
12 L. C. Siebert et al.
Fig. 3. Reducing ambiguity: (a) Precision; (b) Unique solutions; (c) Number of inter-
actions made for reducing ambiguity.
The methods AR− SS and AR−C did not increase confidence in the same
manner, differing in their applicability. While AR − SS was able to reach esti-
mations with less ambiguity than AR−C (Fig. 3. (b)), it required in average of
4.9 more interactions with the user (Fig. 3. (c))10. In 33.2% of the cases where
the estimation was ambiguous, AR− SS could provide a unique solution, while
AR − C provided it for 27.2% of the cases. Considering both the confidence
and the number of interactions needed, AR−C increased the number of unique
solutions by 16.5% per interaction with the SHA-P, while AR− SS increased it
by 4.1% per interaction.
Table 2 summarizes the results when the estimation is performed using 10
rounds of observed data. We can see that precision varied only slightly, but
the confidence in the estimation increased significantly when using any of the
ambiguity reduction methods proposed. The columns related to the “Standard
deviation” on Table 2 provide parameters to understand the dispersion of the
search space11 and of the estimations ([dˆia, vˆwa]). While the search space scatters
with the ambiguity reduction methods, there is a reduction in the dispersion for
the estimations. In other words, as the search space covered by ORa increases,
estimations become less ambiguous (and more gathered).
5 Discussion
AAs must be able to estimate human’s relative preferences towards values and
norms to align their behavior with them. This is not an easy task since a dif-
ferent set of preferences might lead to the same observed behavior (ambiguity
10 The x-axis in Fig. 3 relates to the number of rounds used during the initial estimation
process, described in section 4.1. The additional number of interactions performed
by each method to improve the confidence in the estimations is not included in the
x-axis but presented in Fig. 3. (c).
11 in our case ORa: given that preference to values and norms are constant, demand is
defined according to 4)
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Table 2. Summary of the results for the estimation using 10 rounds, and for the
subsequent ambiguity reduction methods.
Standard deviation
Method Precision % Unique Rounds on AR ORa dˆia vˆwa
Estimation 0.082 57.4 - 36.1 0.021 0.008
AR-SS 0.095 86.7 8.2 42.6 0.011 0.003
AR-C 0.098 83.5 1.8 45.5 0.013 0.003
problem). [18] demonstrated that ‘normative assumptions’ are needed to esti-
mate an agent’s reward function (in our case, values and norms). In this work,
we proposed an ABM that uses both values and norms to account for these ‘nor-
mative assumptions’, and methods to estimate the SHA preferences and reduce
the ambiguity in these estimations.
The first contribution, the proposed ABM, was built on previous works
[15, 17], and especially [16]. We extended the ABM works to use both values
and norms for determining the actions of the agents. The model was calibrated
to represent human behavior from empirical data. Future works can improve this
model by specifying in more detail the use of norms and values, considering other
values than wealth and fairness, constraining behavior by using deontic opera-
tors [16], and incorporating models that represent human bounded rationality.
Furthermore, different application scenarios with a more complex view on value
tensions e.g. non-zero sum game problems considering privacy and security can
be modeled.
The second contribution of this work was focused on understanding to what
extent the proposed methods were able to estimate the relative importance at-
tributed to values and norms by a given agent. We show that even when consider-
ing ‘normative’ assumptions, represented by the PA’s knowledge of the decision-
making process of the SHA in a relatively simple context (the UG), ambiguity
may still be present on estimating preferences for value alignment. To ignore this
ambiguity might lead to great regret and unethical actions.
In the experiment performed we observed two general conditions under which
an estimation of the preferences was possible, namely: heterogeneity on the ob-
servations and a sufficient number of observations. When observing at least four
rounds of the UG, only 50 to 60% of the estimations were unambiguous. We
proposed two methods for reducing ambiguity: one via exploring the search space
(AR−SS) and one using counterfactuals (AR−C). The first approach, AR−SS,
interacts with the SHA-P considering the last observed norm (ORak), which
might be suitable for interacting with people in the real world due to the influ-
ence of short-term memory on decision making [7]. The latter approach, AR−C,
uses counterfactuals, which are a part of causal reasoning. The results presented
in the previous section show that targeting “imaginative” scenarios related to
a specific round of the UG significantly increase the efficiency of the process.
Nevertheless, it might be very demanding for a person to be able to go through
this thought imaginary process and remind the precise social norm at a spe-
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cific point in time. We can conclude that the AR− SS method is more suitable
where there are no restrictions regarding the number of interactions with the
user, while AR−C can improve confidence in situations where a limited number
of interactions is desired.
Both methods act with the assumption that the only way the PA can interact
with the SHA is by taking the role of the responder in the UG. Going beyond this
assumption, we also evaluated a different approach: the PA can directly define a
value for the social norm (ORak). If we consider ORa ∈ [0; 1000], the ambiguity
was almost eliminated: 97% of unique solutions on average, considering up to 20
interactions. If we consider a more realistic assumption ORak ∈ [500; 1000] the
results were, in terms of the percentage of unique solutions, between the levels
found by AR − SS and AR − C when using less than 6 rounds for training,
and slightly better than AR − SS when using 6 or more rounds. Future works
can evaluate this hypothesis. We suggest that such experiments be done either
considering improved models of human memory and cognition process or in
laboratory settings.
The limitations of this works include the impossibility of directly generalizing
the findings and methods to other contexts, the assumption that values are
stable, and the lack of testing of the approach with humans in realistic settings
as well as in more complex settings.
6 Conclusion
This paper aimed to investigate to what extent an AA might be able to estimate
the relative preferences attribute to human values and norms, including methods
to reduce ambiguity. Insight into the use of models to support the estimation
of values and norms was obtained during the discussions, mainly the need for
heterogeneity on the observations and also ways to reduce ambiguity. Especially
the use of counterfactuals via the AR − C approach showed it can be of great
value in terms of a trade-off between increasing efficiency and avoiding excessive
interactions/questions with humans. We showed that even in a simple context,
considering models that represent values and norms (‘normative assumptions’),
and using a exhaustive search process, ambiguity cannot be easily be avoided in
estimation of preference on values and norms. To ignore this ambiguity might
lead to great regret and misalignment between machine behavior and human
values and norms.
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